Where are the world's top 100 I.T. firms - and why? by R.D. Norton




(Preliminary draft. Not for quotation.)2
Like the Internet after 1994, the personal computer or PC started a new era in the evolution
of information technology (IT).  In 1981, prompted by the success of the Apple II, IBM introduced
its PC and marketed it to the business world as a machine with a "killer application," the Lotus 1-2-
3 spreadsheet. The PC’s birth pangs rattled the geography of the U.S. computer industry. To speed
product development, IBM had out-sourced  the microprocessor and operating system. That new
policy both recognized and accelerated the realignment of the industry away from the Northeast.
Today, in the resurgent American IT sector of the late 1990s, the new dominant firms are
headquartered in the West. The result might be described as "The Westward Rebirth of American
Computing." (R.D. Norton, 1996.) In an earlier paper by that name, I made the case that the
regional realignment was a key step toward restoring the U.S. lead in the information-technology
race with Japan, because IBM and Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) had bogged down in the
bureaucratic inertia characteristic of large, mature firms.  New entrepreneurs had to enter the arena,
and their innovations could blossom best in the more open and fluid economic cultures of the West.
This paper updates the story by examining where the world’s leading IT firms were
headquartered in 1997, and why. Our method is to structure the weltering crosscurrents of theory
and evidence via five questions and to propose five tentative answers.
The key issue is, "…and Why?" This, it turns out, is actually three distinct questions. The
lead states in the new IT geography--California, Texas, and Washington--hold strikingly different
roles in the spatial division of labor. In a nutshell, the Texans embody the efficiency and marketing
skills that IBM and Route 128 once claimed. For its part, Silicon Valley is widely recognized as the
world's most creative regional network for new activities--including Internet-related activities. Yet
it is Seattle, not the Valley, that has become the current command center for the world's IT
activities.  Bill Gates, a classic robber-baron visionary, may have had as much to do with the
westward realignment and the American resurgence as Silicon Valley's clustered fountain of youth.
1. WHERE WERE THE 100 "MOST INFLUENTIAL" I.T. FIRMS IN 1997?
TABLE 1 shows the July 1997 PC Magazine list of the world's 100 "most influential" I.T.
firms. The criteria for the list are subjective.  As the compiler puts it, "Our effort to create this…list
started (rather than ended) with a mere enumeration of the sales leaders. …we expanded our search
to target not just the richest or best-known companies but the most influential. …And judging from3
TABLE 1
PC MAGAZINE’S 100 MOST INFLUENTIAL PC COMPANIES IN THE WORLD IN 1997
1 Microsoft Corp.
2 Intel Corp.
3I B M  C o r p .
4 Netscape Communications
5 Sun Microsystems Inc.
6 Compaq Computer Corp.
7 Hewlett-Packard Co.
8 Cisco Sytems Inc.
9 Oracle Corp.
10 Toshiba Corp. Japan
11 Dell Computer Corp.
12 Apple Computer Inc.
12 Adobe Systems Inc.
14 Gateway 2000 Inc.
15 Novell Inc.
16 3Com Corp.
17 Corel Corp. Canada
18 America Online Inc.
19 PointCast Inc.
20 Packard Bell NEC Inc.
21 Softbank Corp. Japan
22 Intuit Inc.
23 Digital Equipment Corp.
24 Silicon Graphics Inc.
25 Symantec Corp.
26 U.S. Robotics Corp.
27 Canon Inc. Japan
28 Progressive Networks Inc.
29 Macromedia Inc.
30 id Software Inc.
31 Seagate Technology Inc.
32 Advanced Micro Devices Inc.
33 S3 Inc.
34 Acer Group Taiwan
35 Marimba Inc.
36 McAfee Associates Inc.
37 Micron Technology Inc.
38 Autodesk Inc.
39 Bay Networks Inc.4
40 Creative Technology Ltd. Singapore
41 GT Interactive Software
Corp.
42 Ascend Communications Inc.




46 CUC International Inc.
47 Computer Associates Intl.
48 AT&T Corp.
49 Texas Instruments Inc.
50 International Data Group




55 Samsung/AST Research Korea
56 Logitech International SA Switzerland
57 Matsushita Electric Industrial Japan
58 National Semiconductor
Corp.
59 PC Connection Inc.
60 Sharp Corp. Japan
61 Fujitsu Ltd. Japan
62 Hitachi Ltd. Japan
63 NEC Corp. Japan
64 Borland International Inc.
65 MetaToold Inc.
66 Matrox Graphics Inc. Canada
67 Sybase Inc.





72 Philips Electronics NV Netherlands
73 Western Digital Corp.
74 Activision Inc.
75 Cirrus Logic Inc.
76 Cabletron Systems







83 DeLorme Mapping Co.
84 Informix Software Inc.
85 Lexmark International Inc.
86 Madge Networks Inc.,
87 Broderbund Software Inc.
88 Phoenix Technologies Ltd.
89 Power Computing Corp.
90 Be Inc.
91 Number Nine Visual
Technologies
92 Eastman Kodak Co.





96 SAP AG Germany
97 The Learning Company Inc.
98 Tektronix Inc.
99 Yahoo! Inc.
100 Firefly Network Inc.6
 our own debate, the relative rankings of the group as a whole will be more than a little
controversial."   (Jake Kirchner, 1997, p. 214.)
Several obvious caveats are in order here. First, the list attempts to answer the question,
"Which companies are the true leaders in personal computing?" (P. 213.) Hence the perspective is
from the PC industry, not from that of mainframes or (whatever is left of) minicomputers. Still, and
as will be suggested shortly, PC’s now set the agenda for all of I.T. Second, this is an American list;
to that extent it is subject to the usual notorious cultural myopia of the U.S.A. Third, the lack of a
single, objective criterion (like the ones used in the traditional Fortune 500 list, for example)
renders the exercise open to dispute, as the editors suggest.
These objections appear slight.  Our concern is not whether the listing of Microsoft first,
Intel as second, and IBM as third is precisely the right ordering. Further, perhaps a key firm or two
at some functional distance from the PC industry, or in another country, has been mistakenly left
off the list.  Such nuances will not matter much here. The method to be employed below is simply
to count regional (and national) locations, among the putative top 100.  Any other list of the top 100
I.T. firms would probably show quite a similar histogram across regions and nations.
This method does have its own specific bias or distortion, however. That is to give as much
weight in a state’s profile to a virtual unknown like Massachusetts’ little Firefly Network Inc.
(number 100 in the list, and since taken over by Microsoft) as to, say, IBM. One cannot necessarily
judge a particular state’s importance in the I.T. picture by the number of top-100 firms that call it
home. Texas and Washington are cases in point--I.T. giants with few (or only one!) top-100 firms.
THE LOCATIONS OF THE TOP 100
That said, a few basic observations can be made about TABLES 1 and 2. Our aim at this
stage is only to lay out the landscape, not to explain the patterns.
(1) Most (80) of the 100 top firms are American. Japan accounts for 10 listings: Toshiba
(number 10), Softbank (21), Canon (27), Sony (43), Seiko (51), Matsushita (57), Sharp (60),
Fujitsu (61), Hitachi (62), and NEC (63).  Canada has three: Corel (17), Matrox Graphics (66), and
ATI Technologies (77).  Collectively, Europe has three (Switzerland’s Logitech International,
the Netherlands’ Philips Electronics, and Germany’s SAP), but none in the top 50. Taiwan’s Acer is
ranked at 34, and Korea’s Samsung/AST Research at 55.  Putting the counts and ranks another way,7
TABLE 2
THE TOP 100 BY STATE, REGION, AND NATIONALITY
State City Company  Primary activity
North (22)
NY (6) New York GT Interactive Software Corp. Software
NY Armonk IBM Corp. hardware/software
NY Alameda Ascend Communications Inc. Internet
NY Islandia Computer Associates International
Inc.
Software
NY New York AT&T Corp. Telecommunications
NY Rochester Eastman Kodak Co. Software
MA (4) Framingham International Data Group Media
MA Maynard Digital Equipment Corp. hardware/software
MA Lexington Number Nine Visual Technologies
Inc.
Telecommunications
MA Cambridge Firefly Network Inc. Internet
NH (3) Milford PC Connection Inc. Distribution
NH Rochester Cabletron Systems Internet
NH Nashua Aimtech Corp. Software
IL (3) Skokie U.S. Robotics Corp. Telecommunications
IL Schaumburg Motorola Inc. Semiconductors
IL Vernon Hills Computer Discount Warehouse Distribution
CT (2) Stamford CUC International Inc. Software
CT Stamford Xerox Corp. Hardware
OH (2) Mayfield
Village
Progressive Networks Inc. media/internet
OH Columbus CompuServe Inc. Internet
ME Yarmouth DeLorme Mapping Co. software/internet
NJ Parsippany Dialogic Corp. Semiconductors
South (5)
      GA (2) Norcross Hayes Microcomputer Products Inc. Telecommunications
GA Norcross Intuit Inc. Software8
KY Lexington Lexmark International Inc. Hardware
VA Dulles America Online Inc. Software
DC Washington MCI Communications Corp. Internet
West (53)
CA (43) Santa Clara Intel Corp. Hardware/semiconduct.
CA Mountain View Netscape Communications Corp. software/internet
CA Mountain View Sun Microsystems, Inc. Software
CA Palo Alto Hewlett-Packard Co. Hardware




CA Cupertino Apple Computer Inc. Hardware
CA San Jose Adobe Systems Inc. Software
CA San Jose Novell Inc. Software
CA Santa Clara 3Com Corp. Internet/hardware
CA Sunnyvale PointCast Inc. Telecomm./internet
CA Sacramento Packard Bell NEC Inc. Hardware
CA Mountain View Silicon Graphics Inc. Hardware
CA Cupertino Symantec Corp. Software
CA San Francisco Macromedia Inc. Internet
CA Scotts Valley Seagate Technology Inc. Hardware
CA Sunnyvale Advanced Micro Devices Inc. Semiconductors
CA Santa Clara S3 Inc. Semiconductors
CA Mountain View Marimba Inc. Software
CA Santa Clara McAfee Associates Inc. Software
CA San Raphael Autodesk Inc. Software
CA Santa Clara Bay Networks Inc. (network)
CA San Jose Diamond Multimedia Systems Inc. media (entertainment)
CA Santa Clara National Semiconductor Corp. Semiconductor
CA Scotts Valley Borland International Inc. Software
CA Carpinterid MetaTools Inc. Software
CA Emeryville Sybase Inc. Software
CA Milpitas Adaptec Inc. Semiconductor
CA Irvine Western Digital Corp. Semiconductor
(software)
CA Santa Monica Activision Inc. Software
CA Fremont Cirrus Logic Corp. Semiconductor
CA MarinaDelRay Quarterdeck Corp. internet/software9
CA Pasadena Idealab! (internet)
CA Menlo Park Informix Software Inc. (database?)
CA Novato Broderbund Software Inc. Software
CA San Jose Pheonix Technologies Ltd. Software
CA Cupertino Power Computing Corp. Hardware
CA Menlo Park Be Inc. Software
CA Santa Cruz The Santa Cruz Operation Inc. Internet
CA Walnut ViewSonic Corp. Hardware
CA Santa Clara Yahoo! Inc. Internet
CA Costa Mesa Rockwell Semiconductor Systems Semiconductor
CA Fremont The Learning Company Inc. Software
TX (5) Houston Compaq Computer Corp. Hardware
TX Round Rock Dell Computer Corp. Hardware
TX Mesquite id Software Inc. Software
TX Richardson Cyrix Corp. Semiconductor
TX Dallas Texas Instruments Inc. Semiconductor
UT Roy Iomega Corp. Software
WA Redmond Microsoft Corp. Software
ID Boise Micron Technology Inc. Semiconductor
OR Wilsonville Tektronix Inc. Hardware
SD Sioux City Gateway 2000 Inc. Hardware
Non-U.S.
(20)
Japan (10) Tokyo Toshiba Corp., Japan Hardware
Japan Tokyo Softbank Corp., Japan software/internet
Japan Tokyo Canon Inc., Japan Hardware
Japan Tokyo Sony Corp., Japan Semiconductors
Japan Tokyo Matsushita Electric Industrial, Japan Hardware
Japan Yao Sharp Corp., Japan Hardware
Japan Tokyo Fujitsu Ltd., Japan semiconductors/hard.









Canada (3) Montreal Matrox Graphics Inc., Canada Semiconductors
Canada Toronto ATI Technologies Inc., Canada Semiconductors
Canada Ottawa Corel Corp., Canada Software
Netherl. (2) Philips Electronics NV, Netherlands software/hardware10
Netherlands Hoofddorp Madge Networks Inc. Telecommunications
Germany SAP AG, Germany Internet
Taiwan San Jose, CA Acer Group Hardware
     Singapore Creative Technology Ltd., Singapore Media
Korea Samsung/AST Research, Korea Semiconductor
Switzerland  Freemont, CA Logitech International SA Hardware11
 44 of the top 50 I.T. firms are American. The role of U.S. firms is thus even more dominant than
the 82% figure suggests since most of the other 18 firms placed only in the second half of the list.
 (2) Within the U.S., 53 of the 80 are in the West. (TABLE 2.) The computer business
originated within the U.S. in the Northeast, presaged by military research in Cambridge and
Philadelphia during World War II, then initiated at IBM in the 1950s, and rejuvenated by the
minicomputer makers along Boston’s Route 128 in the 1960s.  By 1997, however, and as the table
shows, 53 of the world’s top 100 firms are located in states in the western U.S.  Are these numbers
representative of influence within I.T.?  Of the top 10 American firms in the list, the only one
headquartered outside the West is IBM.  Nine of the top 11 I.T. firms in the world, by this count,
are in the U.S. West.
(3) Numerically, 43 of the 53 are in California. At sight, Silicon Valley does it all. The
Valley’s firms make chips (Intel), microcomputers (Apple), network software(Sun and Oracle), and
all manner of Internet-related products and services.
(4) Functionally,  Texas and Washington also stand tall. In practice, Texas has emerged as
the leader in PC sales with number one Compaq/Digital, and distribution powerhouse Dell.
Similarly, the pace-setter for the world’s software is Seattle, where Bill Gates and Paul Allen chose
to return home, where they would court and eventually trade places with IBM.
2. HOW DID THE PC RE-DRAW THE TECHNOLOGY MAP?
Most of today’s top 100 I.T. firms are headquartered in the American West because the
entrepreneurial energy driving the PC revolution originated there.  That is the premise we are
exploring. To illustrate this idea, FIGURE 1 links regional roles to the evolution of computing.
The industry stages were suggested by researchers at Morgan Stanley, an investment bank.
(Meeker and DePuy, 1996.)  As it happens, Commerce Department data on I.T.’s share of corporate
investment in business equipment tend to support the stages approach.  The data show the I.T.
expenditure share jumping first with the advent of personal computers and then after 1994 with the
fruition of the Internet. (FIGURE 2.)
In FIGURE 1, then, I assign characteristic home-regions to the mainframe, mini, and PC
eras. These are New York State for mainframes, Route 128 for minicomputers, and the West12
_____________________________________________________________________________
FIGURE 1.   CHANGES IN REGIONAL ADVANTAGE OVER THE
LIFE CYCLES OF MAINFRAME, MINI, PC, AND INTERNET-ENABLED SYSTEMS
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Source: Adapted by the author from Morgan Stanley Research Estimates as reported in Mary Meeker and
Chris DePuy, The Internet Report (New York: Morgan Stanley, 1996), p. I-9.
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FIGURE 2. The Emerging Digital Economy — April, 199813
generally for the PC era beginning around 1980. (The fourth and current stage, Internet-Enabled
Systems, begins about 1994.)
Did employment shifts reflect the westward shift in corporate power? Yes. Between 1986
and 1994, U.S. employment in computers, chips, and software grew by 13 percent. But in this job-
gaining national context, the Northeast lost six percent of its I.T. employment, as measured by the
aggregates for the three categories. (R.D. Norton, 1998.)
Since 1994, of course, the Internet has sparked a new outburst of entrepreneurial energy. To
help place the transition from the PC era to the Internet era in perspective, we can consider the
ways in which the PC ushered in the Information Age.
HOW THE PC UNIFIED HIGH TECH
Before 1981 there were three major technology industries: mainframe computers, electronic
components, and medical instruments.  The market for computers per se had only two components.
Fortune 500 companies used big computers to compile data-bases for customer billing and
employee records. The federal government (where the Defense Department and NASA relied on
mainframes and supercomputers for military and space programs and the Census Bureau kept
counting) was the other.
The IBM PC broadened the market from corporations and the federal government  to
include all manner of activities. The definition of I.T. changed accordingly:
Today, due in large part to that one significant product introduction in 1981,
virtually every person, company, and government is a customer for technology products.
The definition of technology industries has expanded from large computers to include
personal computers, software, semiconductors, semiconductor equipment, communications
(both telecommunications and data communications), and medical technology
(biotechnology and medical devices). (Michael Murphy, p. 47.)
In this view, the information technology sector today has seven components. These are
 (1) large computers, (2) personal computers, (3) software, (4) semiconductors, (5) semiconductor
equipment, (6) communications, and (7) medical technology (biotech and instruments).14
THE DIGITAL ARENA
The unifying element for all these activities (save only biotech) is digitization. Based on the
microprocessor, a "computer on a chip," the PC could fully reap the advantages of digitization in
ways mainframes and minis could not. But in addition to digitization four other concepts or "laws"
come into play here. One is Moore’s Law (the doubling of chip power every 18 months). The other
three apply to networks. The following capsule summaries may begin to suggest how the Internet
dovetails with the PC to bring telecommunications into the I.T. mainstream.
(1) Digitization. Digitization refers to our capacity to express the four main types of
information (letters, numbers, sounds, and visual images) in terms of 0’s and 1’s. It permits a new
synthesis in which seemingly all information can be converted to the on-off states that transistors
can process at high speed.  It thus ushers in an era in which diverse technologies become not more
mysterious ("kludgey") and distinct, but more elegant and understandable, as analog information
becomes increasingly converted to and stored and processed in binary (digital) forms. (Steve
Byrnes, 1998.)
(2) Moore’s Law. Gordon Moore’s durable empirical rule on the doubling of chip storage
capacity every 18 months implies a new hardware generation every three years or so. As this logic
unfolds decade after decade, the cost savings that follow spread to an ever-wider circle of activities,
goods, and services. In competitive terms, it also means that the I.T. race goes to agile firms, much
to the chagrin of IBM and Japan after 1990.
(3)Packet Switching. As opposed to circuit routing (using a single circuit for a complete
message, but taking up the whole circuit to do it), packet switching allows multiple usage of a
given line. Each packet has 48 characters of content, and 5 as a header.  Packet-switching is how
the Internet works, and what makes it so powerful.
(4) Metcalf’s Law. The cost of adding another node to the network increases linearly, while
the value to network participants of adding a new member to the network increases with the square
of the number of users. Graphically, a linear increase in costs can thus be overtaken by a quadratic
rise in user benefits. That is, beyond a certain threshold benefits swamp costs, enhancing the value
of large networks. By contrast, before the Internet proprietary closed networks kept numbers small
enough to prevent the payoffs from accruing. The Internet, a network of networks, broke such
constraints.15
 (5) Gilder’s Law. Another empirical "law," this describes the unsteady movement toward
fiber optic cable as an ultimate stage for transmitting digital information. It predicts (thus far
reliably) a tripling of bandwidth or carrying capacity every 12 months.
3. HOW DID TEXAS BECOME THE PC STATE?
"The war is over, and the Texans have won."
The quotation refers to Compaq’s 1998 takeover of Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC),
the tarnished jewel in the faded crown of the minicomputer complex along Boston’s Route 128. The
result is a consolidation of operations that will trim15,000 DEC employees while giving Compaq a
diversified service dimension enabling it to challenge IBM across the spectrum.
Texas has the two leading PC producers in the world, Compaq and Dell.  On the list,
Compaq is rated the fifth most influential I.T. company, Dell the 11th.
How did the Lone Star State become the PC State? The two different companies present
two different puzzles to be solved, in that their origins are completely independent of each other.
For Compaq, the answer is a classic case study in industrial evolution. For Dell, the story turns
more on the sheer entrepreneurial prowess of the company founder, who began the business from a
college dorm room at the University of Texas in Austin.
Compaq’s lineage traces a precise logic of industrial evolution. In the 1930s engineers with
a new technology for seismic oil exploration came to Dallas and founded Texas Instruments (TI).
The technologies they employed led naturally to semiconductor research and in 1959 to the co-
discovery of the integrated circuit by Jack Kilby, a TI engineer. Military and space contracts from
the federal government spurred the company’s ascent to one of the top semiconductor
manufacturers in the U.S. by the 1970s.
In 1983 (?) four TI engineers from the company’s Houston facility broke away to form a
spin-off. Their leader was Rod Canion, and the company was Compaq.  The new company
patiently reverse-engineered the then new IBM PC, so that it could legally invent its own BIOS
chip to emulate the PC for 100 percent software compatibility.  That was Compaq’s breakthrough,
and it allowed the company to serve the role of legitimate king of the PC clonemakers. That is how16
Compaq achieved the fastest rise from corporate inception to Fortune 500 status in history--a record
Dell would itself later break.
What is the moral of the story? The link between resource endowments and innovative
capacity. Historically, the development of technological strength in an American region can
typically be traced to the region’s resource base.  (Harvey Perloff and Lowdon Wingo, 1968.) A
given resource endowment either generates or fails to spark a related set of resource-processing
activities that in turn encourage the development of new skills and technologies. (Norton and Rees,
1979.) That was the Manufacturing Belt of the Northeast and Upper Midwest attained its status as
the nation’s seedbed for innovation in the century from 1850 to 1950.  The 60-year path from oil
exploration to Compaq’s world leadership in PC production displays a similar logic.
In contrast, Dell’s meteoric rise in the 1990s has no such precisely traceable lineage.
Instead, Michael Dell’s strategy of devising a new distribution system to "mass-customize" the PC
to order and to get the product delivered in a matter of days through the mail blazes no new
technology trails.   That, come to think of it, is the same accusation that is often made about Bill
Gates: "His skills are not in technology, but in business acumen."  Whether this comment is
negative depends of course on the context. In any case, it points up the possibility that an
entrepreneurial genius on the order of Gates or Dell may have a unique story to offer, one that fits
awkwardly at best into any traditional location-theory framework.
And that brings us to the software side, and to the center of the world software industry,
Seattle.
4. WHY DID SEATTLE GET TO MAKE THE NEW RULES?
Why is Seattle the center of power in the world software industry today? On one level, the
answer is self-evident. Bill Gates and Paul Allen returned home from New Mexico to Seattle when
he and Paul Allen were ready to move their tiny start-up software company to the next stage.  That
may actually be the long and the short of Microsoft’s location. Bill Gates (by all accounts a business
genius on a par with Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rockefeller, or Henry Ford), happens to have come
from Seattle, and chose to locate the business in the Seattle suburb of Redmond. Then he unleashed
his boundless ambition upon the software world and conquered it.17
There are two further and related points that help put the conquest in perspective, but
neither of them has much to do with location theory.
One is the familiar story of IBM’s outsourcing decision in its crash campaign to get the PC
from the drawing board to retail shelves within one year.  That deadline led Big Blue to go outside
its corporate walls for the microprocessor (to Intel) and the system software. Initially the system
software was to come from Gary Kildahl in California. He dropped the ball, however, and so IBM
turned to Bill Gates, who was initially their choice only for his version of the BASIC programming
language. IBM wanted a 16-bit operating system. Gates quickly bought one from another Seattle
programmer for a song ($50,000), and the result was to become MS-DOS.
 This was the operating system that would be shipped with every IBM PC. Like the Intel
chip, it became the standard all clones and all PC software developers would have to use in their
designs. As it happened, the fees  Microsoft earned from IBM, whether up-front or per machine,
were negligible. The payoff came from firms like Compaq and the clone-makers, all of whom had
to pay per-machine licensing fees.
How IBM and Microsoft traded places can be sketched briefly here. Just as Compaq
managed to reverse-engineer the PC’s BIOS chip and outsource for the hardware components and
software, so too would the army of other clone-makers around the world. Despite the tremendous
initial revenues the PC brought IBM, as the 1980s wore on competition from the cheaper clones
steadily eroded IBM’s profits from the PC. Meantime Microsoft’s sales and power mounted apace.
By the early 1990s (thus well before Windows 95 became the resident operating system on 9 out of
10 of the world’s personal computers), Microsoft’s stock-market capitalization, like Intel’s,
surpassed IBM’s. The reason Wall Street viewed Microsoft and Intel so favorably was that the two
together had replaced IBM as standard-setters for much of the I.T. sector.
The second consideration in Seattle’s ascent, then, is that the key to profitability in the new
computer world from about 1986 onward is standard-setting. For Intel, Microsoft, Hewlett-Packard
(regarding printer protocols), Novell (temporarily), and other standard-setting firms, the key to
success is the paradoxical combination of proprietary control of a dominant open-systems standard.
In the open-systems (i.e., published codes and specifications) competition that has flourished since
the mid-1980s, the company that manages to set a standard for software developers and peripheral
devices has an advantage over its competitors--even though its competitors have access to most of
its code and designs.  (Charles H. Ferguson and Charles R. Morris, 1994.)  Other I.T. players,18
notably to PC manufacturers themselves, are left scrambling for the crumbs in an intensely
competitive world of razor-thin profit margins.
In sum, to the question of why Seattle gets to set the standard for the PC’s evolution, the
answer has little to do with location theory, and everything to do with the role of a titanic
entrepreneur who saw before others the strategic advantage conferred by standard-setting.
Here we might recall Thomas Carlyle’s nineteenth-century "great-man" theory of history that, in
effect, France conquered Europe because Napoleon was a Frenchman. By the same token, it
appears that Seattle makes the rules because Bill Gates happened to grow up there.
     5.  HOW DID SILICON VALLEY HAPPEN?
Silicon Valley started with electronic components and transistors, moved on to memory and
logic chips, and diversified across the whole I.T. spectrum. Perhaps a word or two about the name
of the world’s most famous industrial cluster is in order. William Shockley had been a co-inventor
of the transistor in 1947 for Bell Labs, which would later garner him a Nobel Prize. (He then
parleyed the prestige of the prize to publicize his peculiar "theories" of racial differences.)
In 1955 Shockley returned from New Jersey to his home state to start a transistor company
in Mountain View, near Stanford.  He called it Shockley Semiconductor because the transistor
could be switched on or off to register a 0 or 1 in binary code, depending on whether it was in a
conductive or non-conductive mode. This "semiconductor" property is present in the minerals
germanium and silicon. Years later, in 1971, a newsletter writer named Don C. Hoefler accordingly
coined the term, "Silicon Valley." (Everett M. Rogers and Judith K. Larsen, 1984, pp. 25-26.)
STANFORD AS A CATALYST
Shockley moved west to Mountain View in part because it was his native ground and his
mother still lived there.  But business logic also favored the move.  Two key components were
already in place to create a seedbed for new enterprises. One was the Stanford Industrial Park
launched in 1951 and followed in 1954 by the Stanford Research Park. The impetus was not
economic development but the desire to make money from real estate the university owned yet (by
the terms of Leland Stanford’s gift) could not sell.  The second keystone was Hewlett-Packard,19
started on the eve of World War II to manufacture electronic oscillators by two Stanford students,
who were encouraged by an electrical engineering professor interested in negative feedback, Fred
Terman.  The two components converged in 1954 when H-P took a lease in the Stanford Research
Park and served as the anchor for subsequent tenants. (Rogers and Larsen, chapter 2.)
In any case, Shockley had barely started his semiconductor company when it foundered on
a legendary spin-off, which would eventually beget Intel. As Robert X. Cringely has said, Silicon
Valley is "a place that was invented one afternoon in 1957 when Bob Noyce and seven other
engineers quit en masse from Shockley Semiconductor" to found Fairchild Semiconductor, as a
division of the established Syosset, New York, firm Fairchild Camera and Instrument. (Cringely,
1993, p. 36.)
Fairchild’s "Traitorous Eight," (as Shockley saw them) share credit with Texas Instruments
for inventing integrated circuits (ICs).  Germanium ICs were designed by Jack Kilby at TI in
Dallas, but he lacked a method of layering transistors on a flat surface. Jean Hoerni, one of the
Fairchild Eight, came up with a "planar" technique to embed rather than stack component layers.
Noyce carried the idea through to create complete circuit maps on a single silicon slice, clearing the
way for photolithography (or "burning" the circuits into the slice) and thus for batch production. TI
and Fairchild both announced the breakthrough in 1959. ICs came into production within two
years, for use by the U.S. government at $100 apiece to miniaturize the future Apollo moon rocket’s
onboard computer (Palfreman and Swade, 1991, pp. 87-91).
INTEL SPARKS THE PC REVOLUTION
A decade later Noyce, Moore, and others jumped ship again to found Intel, a more
egalitarian company than Fairchild’s eastern owners would permit. Like Hewlett and Packard
before him, and as a minister’s son from Iowa, Noyce did without dress codes, reserved parking
places, closed offices, executive dining rooms, and the other status trappings of more mature U.S.
corporations. The remote control foundered on the divergent philosophies of Syosset and Silicon
Valley. "Noyce couldn’t get Fairchild’s eastern owners to accept that idea that stock options should
be a part of compensation for all employees, not just for management. He wanted to tie everyone,
from janitors to bosses, into the overall success of the company" (Cringely, 1993, p. 39).20
Noyce and his colleagues thus formed Intel in 1968, as a spin-off (like its competitor
National Semiconductor and some 50 other companies) from Fairchild. Intel made its mark on the
world in November 1971 when it announced a triple breakthrough: the microprocessor, dynamic
random access memory (DRAM), and erasable programmable memory (EPROM) for software.
Here was the package to make personal computers a reality. As George Gilder puts it,
Intel is the most important company in the history of the microcosm. All the
key components of the personal computer--the working memory, the software
memory, and microprocessor CPU--emerged during the magical first three years
of the company’s existence, between 1969 and 1971. Until Intel’s breakthroughs,
computers were large and cost a minimum of tens of thousands of dollars. After
Intel’s three-year surge, computers could be build for a few hundred dollars. This
was…the revolution. (Gilder, 1989, p. 92.)
But for three years nothing happened. The revolution would only finally begin in earnest
when a new generation of entrepreneurs stepped onto the stage. In other words, microprocessors
were at first ignored by the mainframe and minicomputer establishments. Then the January 1975
edition of Popular Electronics spurred Gates and Allen to develop system software for the MITS
Altair computer kit adorning the magazine's cover. At that same historical moment, Steve Wosniak
and Steve Jobs put together an early Apple, and they did it the same way Hewlett and Packard had
made their first oscillators--in a garage in the Valley. Thus it took four teen-ish mavericks from the
West to capitalize on the potential of the "computer-on-a-chip." When the dust cleared, the upshot
was a westward tilt of American computing, toward Silicon Valley.
By 1982 the Valley was already the high-tech seedbed, accounting for 60 percent of the
electronics firms in the U.S.  That year Route 128's Massachusetts ran a distant second, with 112
firms registered as members of the American Electronics Association--barely 10 percent of
California's 1,111 member firms. (Rogers and Larsen, p. 28.)
Nor has the Internet revolution since 1994 diluted the Valley's concentration.  In our list of
the world's top 100 I.T. firms, Silicon Valley alone accounts for some 40 firms, or nearly half the
entire U.S. contingent.21
REGIONAL NETWORKS
Silicon Valley is therefore if anything more prominent on the world I.T. landscape with
every passing year. How do the Valley’s origins shed light on its stellar performance as an I.T.
seedbed today?
A widely accepted interpretation comes from Annalee Saxenian. She draws on the
industrial-district (or cluster) model formulated by Alfred Marshall a century or more ago and re-
introduced in 1984 in The Second Industrial Divide by Michael Piore and Charles Sabel, a treatise
on "flexible specialization" as the developmental stage succeeding "Fordism" or mass production.
They emphasized the virtues of the "Third Italy" and its industrial clusters specializing in high-
fashion, design-intensive goods.  They saw virtuous networks emerging among rival firms, which
managed to cooperate around activities of mutual benefit such as training, marketing, and market
research.  As John Cassidy puts it in a recent reference to their work, "The key to the area’s
success…was that it was geographically dense but economically decentralized." (Cassidy, 1998, p.
125.)
Saxenian built on this model to compare Silicon Valley's adaptability with Route 128's
decline as a minicomputer center. Her 1994 work, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition
in Silicon Valley and Route 128, highlights differences in communications patterns between the two
clusters. A useful image for her thesis is the "Wagon Wheel," a Santa Clara "watering hole" where
engineers and other techies from sometimes competing companies gather to drink and talk shop.
(The "watering hole" reference appears to be part of Valley lore, as the same phrase appears in the
same context in Rogers and Larsen's earlier account.) No such oasis is detected in Route 128's more
buttoned-down, up-tight corporate landscape.
The phrase Saxenian used to describe Silicon Valley is "network-based industrial systems."
The phrase refers to a project-oriented adaptive mode of production that may be seen not only in
Silicon Valley but also to the south, in Hollywood.  As she told Cassidy in a 1998 interview,
You have these very fluid labor markets and these communities of highly skilled
people who recombine repeatedly. They come together for one project--in this
case a new film, in Silicon Valley it would be a new firm--and then they move on.
The system allows a lot of flexibility and adaptiveness.  …Information about new22
markets and new technologies flows very quickly.  This sustains the importance
of geographic proximity, despite the fact that, theoretically, the technology allows
you to be anywhere." (Cassidy, p. 125.)
THE SEEDBED AT WORK TODAY
All this helps us to understand Silicon Valley’s continuing prominence in the generation of
the I.T. firms of the future.  One way of appraising its role as a seedbed is to survey a list of the
most promising privately held I.T. firms. The logic of the inquiry is that firms in the start-up and
prototype stages of their life-cycles often rely on venture capital for financing.  Venture capital
firms, in turn, hope to invest in promising young firms, but to recoup their investment at a profit by
taking the firm to an Initial Public Offering (IPO) of stock at the earliest opportunity.  Hence to
scan a list of promising privately held (i.e., not held publicly by shareholders from the larger world)
companies is a way of glimpsing the future of I.T.
In that light, TABLE 3 suggests an even larger role for the Valley as the Internet Age
unfolds.  Fully two-thirds of the "hot 100" on the list are from California, and all but a handful are
from the general vicinity of Silicon Valley.  In contrast, Microsoft’s home state has only four firms
on the list, Texas only three.  As befits M.I.T.’s backyard, the state with the second largest count is
Massachusetts, which has a dozen.   Other countries account for only four firms on the list.
Whether this represents American myopia, a failure of participants in international capital markets
to recognize foreign opportunities, or both is not clear.
What is clear from the list is that Silicon Valley gives little sign of succumbing to the perils
of industrial maturity, or of surrendering its status as the most fertile spawning ground of new I.T.
enterprises in the world.
6. ENTREPRENEURS AND CONTINENTS
To sum up, U.S. leadership in information technology has been enhanced by the younger
economic cultures of the West, fertile settings for new-enterprise formation. The account offered
here may shed light on the varied reasons for the emergence of a new spatial division of labor in
American computing. The regional realignment within the continental system allowed the shift23
TABLE 3
THE "H0T 100" PRIVATELY HELD IT FIRMS BY REGION
State City Company Primary Activity
North
MA Cambridge Allaire Corp. Net Infrastructure
MA Lexington Centra Software Inc. Net Infrastructure
MA Cambridge Instinctive Technology Inc. Net Infrastructure
MA Burlington SilverStream Software Net Infrastructure
MA Concord StarBurst Communications
Corp.
Net Infrastructure
MA Framingham Connected Corp. Enterprise Software
MA Chelmsford MatrixOne Inc. Enterprise Software
MA Marlborough Artel Video Systems Inc. Unlike Anything Else
MA Framingham Maker Communications Inc. Semiconductor
MA Cambridge One Source Informations
Services Inc.
Online Content
MA Canton SR Research Inc. E-Commerce
MA Waltham Trellix Corp. Business Automation
Software
IL Elmhurst FastParts Inc. E-Commerce
MN Minneapolis Net Perceptions Inc. Net Infrastructure
NJ Iselin Datek Online Holdings Corp. E-Commerce
NY New York InterWorld Corp. E-Commerce
OH Columbus Pathlore Software Enterprise Software
PA Exton Bentley Systems Inc. Business Automation
Software
South
MD Timonium RDA Consultants Ltd. Business Automation
Software
MD Germantown Telogy Networks Communications
Equipment
VA Dulles Vastera Inc. E-Commerce24
West
CA San Mateo Actuate Software Corp. Enterprise Software
CA Mt. View AlphaBlox Corp. Enterprise Software
CA Mt. View AnswerSoft Inc. Enterprise Software
CA Menlo Park Broadbase Information Systems
Inc.
Enterprise Software
CA Oakland Cloudscape Inc. Enterprise Software
CA Burlingame CrossWorlds Software Inc. Enterprise Software
CA San Francisco Eventus Software Inc. Enterprise Software
CA Emeryville Extensity Inc. Enterprise Software
CA Los Angeles Glovia International, LLC Enterprise Software
CA Sunnyvale Junglee Corp. Enterprise Software
CA Palo Alto Sagent Technology Inc. Enterprise Software
CA Mt. View SmartPatents Inc. Enterprise Software
CA Menlo Park Sqribe Technologies Corp. Enterprise Software
CA San Mateo Virage Inc. Enterprise Software
CA San Jose BackWeb Technologies Inc. Net Infrastructure
CA San Mateo Inktomi Corp. Net Infrastructure
CA Redwood Liquid Audio Net Infrastructure
CA Cupertino Magnifi Inc. Net Infrastructure
CA Mt. View Marimba Inc. Net Infrastructure
CA Menlo Park NetDynamics Inc. Net Infrastructure
CA San Mateo NetGravity Inc. Net Infrastructure
CA San Jose One Touch Systems Inc. Net Infrastructure
CA Cupertino Preview Software Inc. Net Infrastructure
CA Santa Clara Ramp Networks Inc. Net Infrastructure
CA Palo Alto Tibco Inc. Net Infrastructure
CA Foster City Wallop Software Inc. Net Infrastructure
CA Alameda Wink Communications Net Infrastructure
CA Santa Clara Active Software Inc. Business Automation
Software
CA San Jose Agile Software Inc. Business Automation
Software
CA San Francisco Amplitude Software Business Automation
Software
CA Sunnyvale Ariba Technologies Inc. Business Automation
Software
CA Palo Alto Blue Pumpkin Software Inc. Business Automation
Software




GoldMine Software Business Automation
Software
CA Menlo Park Informatica Corp. Business Automation
Software
CA Oakland Vision Software Tools Inc. Business Automation25
Software
CA Santa Clara VitalSigns Software Business Automation
Software
CA Santa Clara Finjan Inc. Networking
CA Mt. View Juniper Networks Inc. Networking
CA Palo Alto Kana Communications Inc. Networking
CA Sunnyvale RadioLan Networking
CA El Dorado Hills ShareWave Inc. Networking
CA San Jose TeraStor Corp. Networking
CA Mt. View Visto Corp. Networking
CA San Jose VPNet Technologies Inc. Networking
CA Santa Monica GeoCities Online Content
CA San Francisco PlanetOut Corp. Online Content
CA Sunnyvale PointCast Inc. Online Content
CA San Francisco Quokka Sports Online Content
CA Palo Alto Vicinity Online Content
CA Mt. View WhoWhere Inc. Online Content
CA Sunnyvale Chromatic Research Inc. Semiconductor
CA San Jose Logic Vision Inc. Semiconductor
CA San Jose Neoparadigm Labs Inc. Semiconductor
CA Santa Clara Ambit Design Systems Inc. Semiconductor
CA Campbell I-Cube Inc. Semiconductor
CA Sunnyvale Rendition Inc. Semiconductor
CA Walnut Creek Commerce One Inc. E-Commerce
CA San Jose CyberSource Corp. E-Commerce
CA Palo Alto E-Loan Inc. E-Commerce
CA San Francisco Intershop Communications Inc. E-Commerce
CA Menlo Park Release Software Corp. E-Commerce
CA Milpitas Berkeley Networks Inc. Communications
Equipment
CA Milpitas Sentient Networks Communications
Equipment
CA Foster City Whistle Communications Corp. Communications
Equipment
CA Menlo Park Nuance Communications. Unlike Anything Else
CA San Jose Iready Corp. Unlike Anything Else
TX Austin Deja News Inc. Online Content
TX Austin Smart Technologies Inc. Enterprise Software
TX Austin Vignette Corp. Net Infrastructure
UT Salt Lake City TenFold Corp. Unlike Anything Else
WA Seattle Icat Corp. E-Commerce
WA Seattle Ichat Inc. Net Infrastructure
WA Bellevue Onyx Software Corp. Enterprise Software26





Pivotal Software Inc. Business Automation
Software
Canada Toronto Platform Computing Corp. Enterprise Software
England Cambridge Advanced RISC Machines Ltd. Semiconductor
Israel Tel Aviv Mirabilis Ltd. Online Content
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from mature, managerial firms of the Northeast to the more entrepreneurial firms of the West, from
Texas to Seattle.
In contrast, one reason for the eclipse of Europe’s I.T. sector seems to be the smaller role
played by entrepreneurs, relative to large firms. The longstanding failure on the continent to spark
the formation and growth of new enterprises over time appears to have left Europe’s economies
vulnerable to the eventual stagnation that tends to afflict all large, mature corporations.
The result, as Lester Thurow observes, is that Europe has fallen by the wayside in the
world’s growth industries (Thurow 1998):
When breakthrough technologies occur, it is very difficult for old large
firms to lead. They have to cannibalize themselves to save themselves,
and that is simply very difficult to do. If one looks at the 25 biggest firms
(based upon stock market capitalization) in the United States in 1960 and
again in 1997, six of America’s twenty-five biggest firms either did not
exist in 1960 or were very small.  In contrast, in Europe all of the twenty-
five biggest firms in 1997 were big in 1960. In the past four decades Europe
has been able to grow no new big firms that could lead the world technologically.
The U.S. has the advantage of regional diversity on a larger scale, within a common
institutional framework. The diverse economic cultures of U.S. regions, I have suggested,
encourage the generation and development of entrepreneurial enterprises. To that extent, the
changes now occurring in Europe may help open up new possibilities for entrepreneurial creativity.28
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